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ABSTRACT Social values are argued to effect economic life. The literature distinguishes several key
social values, such as social capital, modernism and tolerance. Overlapping and conflicting views
argue that higher levels of social values correlate with higher levels of economic development.
Our paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we develop a comprehensive theoretical
model on the relation between social values and economic development. Second, we test this model
for European regions. Our findings suggest that social values matter but that they work on the level
of subgroups in the population rather than the region as a whole.
Of all the factors influencing economic development, social values are perhaps the mistiest
and least understood of all. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, the concept of
social values itself is elusive. The impressive literature on social values (and the related
literature on culture) notwithstanding, a definition of social values and a conceptual under-
standing of how they affect economic development remain very much the subject of
debate. The second reason is that different social values never work in isolation of one
another (Landes, 1998). Consequently, social values have never enjoyed popularity
among economists as a variable in their research. However, economists have increasingly
come to recognize the importance of “soft factors”, such as social values. The growing
literature on social capital stands as proof of that. Social capital is an attribute of relations
among human beings (economic actors) and is sometimes even defined as an asset of
individuals (Field, 2003; Westlund, 2006). Since the study of economics is largely
about the economic behaviour of individuals, social capital can be easily involved.
Social values, although exercised by individuals, are more commonly seen as an attribute
of societies, which means that it should be studied at the level of nations or sub-national
regions.
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This contribution adds to the literature on the influence of social values to the economic
development of regions. To the extent that social values matter in the explanation of
regional development, regional differences in economic development should correlate
with regional differences in social values. Following Granato et al. (1996), we define
social values (or culture) as “a basic system of common values that help shape the behavior
of the people in a given society” (p. 608). The key notion here is that social values shape
behaviour. Certain behaviours, such as risk-taking, embracing new technologies and
openness towards new ideas, are considered more conducive to economic development
than a more inward-looking attitude (Landes, 1998; Huntington & Harrison, 2000). The
difficulty in the present discussion is that the literature distinguishes very different kinds
of behaviour in relation to economic development. For example, the protestant work
ethics identified by Weber (2003/1905) triggers a different kind of behaviour from the
bohemian and creative values advocated by Florida (2002a). So where social values (or
culture) are often understood as a fairly homogeneous set of behaviours and characteristics
of the people in a society (Granato et al., 1996; Hofstede, 1980), the behaviours that are
conducive to economic development may originate from a diverse set of social values.
Moreover, a society may host several types of social values; it need not be a matter of
either protestant work ethics or bohemianism, it may be both. Therefore, the emphasis of
this paper is on the (set of) social values that are present in a society rather than on
culture as an aggregate concept. The assumption is that social values, which reflect
culture, shape the behaviour of individuals. Of course, the causal chain linking the social
values of a region’s population to the economic development of that region is a long one.
The behaviour that is a crucial element in this chain is performed on the level of individuals,
not of populations and regions. But if social values are assumed to be responsible for a
climate in which entrepreneurial behaviour can flourish, then it makes sense to explain
how different social values contribute to the economic development of regions.
The literature distinguishes several types of social values that may create a favourable
climate for economic development. Weber’s protestant ethic stresses the virtues of hard
work. Social capital (Putnam, 2000) emphasizes the role of social networks. Inglehart
(Granato et al., 1996) argues that modernity rather than traditionalism favours economic devel-
opment. Florida (2002a), finally, stresses the role of tolerance for non-traditional life-styles.
Departing from the assumption that social capital positively affects regional economic
development, we estimate a path model that explains how the various types of social
values that feature in the literature affect this causal relation. The path model contributes
to the literature on social values and economic development in two ways. First, most con-
tributions on this subject are theoretical or explorative in nature. Second, empirical con-
tributions mostly focus on one or a few social values, while we take a comprehensive view.
This paper is structured as follows. The next sections discuss how several social values
contribute to regional development. Next we present a comprehensive theoretical model
that includes the different social values and the causal relations between them. We con-
tinue by discussing the data and operationalizations that form the basis of our empirical
analysis. The final two sections discuss our empirical findings and the conclusions.
Social Capital
Social capital is not a social value as such, but is a “soft factor” that has been credited
with having a large explanatory role in social and economic development in the recent


























































literature (Field, 2003). One of social capital’s most prominent authors, Robert Putnam,
argues that social capital refers to social connections and the attendant norms and trust
(Putnam, 1995 in Iyer et al., 2005, p. 1017). In a similar vain, Coleman (1988) explained
that social capital facilitates coordination and cooperation for the mutual benefit of an
association’s members. Social capital, then, may be seen as an infrastructure, a social
network that connects individuals and where the interactions between these individuals
are supported by shared norms, values and trust (Westlund, 2006, p. 8). The value of
social capital is two-fold. In the first place, being connected to others gives individuals
access to opportunities, information and resources that would otherwise be beyond their
reach. Secondly, shared norms, values and trust make social interactions more efficient
(Burt, 2005). One of the effects of social capital, thus, is that it affects the behaviour of
individuals in social networks. Since networks are valuable, people will be inclined to
observe their norms and values so as not to breach trustful relations with their associates.
In this way, individuals strengthen the quality of their social relations. Moreover,
simply by having more connections, the quantity of social interactions may increase,
which produces externalities in the form of individual welfare (Granovetter, 1973;
Coleman, 1988; Burt, 2005; Iyer et al., 2005). However, social capital is not exclusively
beneficial. Social networks can also encourage an inward-looking attitude where
individual behaviour is closely monitored by the group and individuals are coerced
into observing group norms and values. In other words, depending on the kind of
norms and values that are dominant in a social network, social capital can be either
good or bad (Field, 2003).
Measuring social capital as a regional characteristic presents difficulties because it is
actually formed on the level of individuals and social relations. Beugelsdijk and Van
Schaik (2005) use measurements that say something about the number of social ties
that can be found within a region and the time people spend on these ties. The idea
behind this is as follows. Connections enable individuals to get access to opportunities,
resources and information; therefore, the more the population of a region has social con-
nections, the more externalities these connections produce that contribute to the social and
economic development of the population and the region. This measure thus emphasizes
the social infrastructure aspect of social capital. A greater number of social ties indicate
a higher level of regional social capital. Moreover, the way in which the amount of
social ties are measured, for example, in terms of the time that people spend on club activi-
ties, social engagements, meeting friends, etc., also says something about the investments
in social capital of a region’s population (Westlund, 2006, p. 22).
The problems of this argument are obvious, too. The fact that a social infrastructure is
in place and that people invest in it does not automatically imply that individuals use it
for the purpose of economic development. Moreover, the presence of a social infrastruc-
ture and the time people spend on it may say something about the quantity of the social
connections in a region, but it does not necessarily say anything about their quality.
Nonetheless, norms, values and trust make up a major part of the value of social
capital. But the measure cannot distinguish between good or bad social capital. One
way to include norms and values in the measurement of regional social capital is to
hypothesize that certain norms and values are beneficial to the functioning of social net-
works. The more those norms and values are manifest in a region, the more the social
networks in a region benefit from them, and the more they are able to produce favourable
economic externalities. Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik (2005) suggest using the extent to


























































which the population of a region thinks that, in general, other people can be trusted as a
proxy for the quality of social ties. Related to this, Westlund (2006) observed that
Putnam (1993 in Westlund, 2006, p. 96) argued that homogeneity of a population
strengthens social ties, while Florida (2002a) argued in favour of heterogeneity. In
other words, either homogeneity or heterogeneity may be used as an indicator for the
quality of a region’s social capital.
In a study on the impact of social capital on innovation in regions, Hauser et al. (2007)
also distinguished between the social networks and social values aspects of social capital.
They found that the different elements of social capital (networks and the various values)
have different effects on innovation. On the whole, though, social capital had a
considerable effect on innovation, comparable to that of human capital. These results
are corroborated by the findings of Akçomak and ter Weel (2007), who concluded that
regions with higher levels of social capital are more likely to benefit from EU regional
support programmes for innovation and economic growth.
In this paper, we choose to separate the two aspects of social capital: social networks and
social values. The key argument for this is the inflation of several levels of analysis in
the above lines of thought. Norms and values are a characteristic of social networks
and are specific to different social networks (Etzioni, 1996; Field, 2003; Morgan, 2004).
The norms and values that are manifest at the level of a (regional) population need not
overlap with those governing social networks. In other words, the number of chains in
the causal link between manifest norms and values and the social infrastructure of a
region, on the one hand, and the economic development of that region, on the other hand,
become so plentiful as to render the claimed theoretical mechanism questionable from an
empirical perspective. We measure social networks as the presence of, and the investments
in, a regional social infrastructure. The social values aspect we give more emphasis by
distinguishing between several types of social values and their effect on regional
development. We conceptualize the network aspect of social capital as our “social networks”
variable. The various social values are captured in several other variables.
Protestant Ethics
One of the first studies into the role of social values in relation to economic development is
Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (2003/1905). In this book,
Weber argued that Protestant, puritan ethics, are a major driving force behind the ascent
of capitalism in Western societies. Capitalism, he argued, benefits from workers who
are extremely dedicated to their craft, which they see as an end in itself, a calling
(p. 53). The spirit of capitalism, then, is an “attitude which, in the pursuit of a calling,
strives systematically for profit in its own sake” (p. 51). This protestant ethic favoured
the spirit of capitalism through an emphasis on hard work. While other religions, too,
have respect for secular everyday labour, Weber argued that for Protestants it is particu-
larly important as worldly success is believed to be a sign of God’s blessing and that the
person enjoying this success has been saved by God. Furthermore, the puritan protestant
ethic forbids people to indulge in worldly pleasures, so any capital gains must be invested,
thus further fuelling capitalist development.
Weber did not limit the spirit of capitalism to Western culture, since it is an attitude of
individuals, in particular entrepreneurs. Nor is the spirit of capitalism inseparable from
religion. As Weber observed, some of the most passionate capitalists of his day were


























































not at all religious persons. In the language of this paper, the Protestant ethic embraces
certain social values which favour economic development, such as hard work and
investing one’s earnings rather than spending them. The fact that these social values
originate from protestant religious beliefs does not require a whole population to be
religious for these values to become pervasive in their society. Nor does Weber claim
that a protestant ethic is the only factor contributing to the rise of capitalism in protestant
societies. The advent of rationalism in the pursuit of science, in economic enterprise, and
in government administration all contribute to the elimination of magic from the world
(p. 60) and encouraged people to take their destiny in their own hands rather than to
leave it to a God. So the spirit of capitalism may more accurately be seen as the spirit
of rationality.
In the contemporary literature, the value of Weber’s argument is still acknowledged—as
are his above-mentioned reservations. Landes (1998), too, argued that emphasizing hard
work and investing the earnings from the work is a potent social value behind economic
development. Particularly, in combination with other factors, such as scientific develop-
ment and reliable institutions, the protestant ethic seems to be an important factor in the
explanation of differences in economic development between societies. Porter (2000)
makes similar observations. In order to establish the role of the protestant ethic in
economic development, we need to find what social values are present in a society that
emphasizes work over pleasure.
Modernism Versus Traditionalism
In recent years, Inglehart has conducted much research into the relation between culture
(values), and economic development. Building on the motivational literature, he argues
that certain values stress individual economic achievement, whereas others inhibit it
(Granato et al., 1996, p. 609). These values are “encouraged in children by their
parents, schools, and other agents of socialization” (p. 610). Empirical research into the
relationship between social values and economic development has led Inglehart to con-
clude that modernist values encourage individuals to pursue economic achievement and
correlate this with economic development of societies. Values stressing traditionalism
achieve the opposite (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). The causal relation between values and
economic development works both ways. As argued, modernism encourages the pursuit
of economic achievement but economic development is also conducive to modernism
(Landes, 1998; Inglehart & Baker, 2000).
As Inglehart found, “The worldviews of the peoples in rich societies differ systemati-
cally from those of low-income societies across a wide range of political, social, and
religious norms and beliefs (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 23). Inglehart identified two
dimensions that “reflect cross-national polarization between traditional versus secular-
rational orientations towards authority; and survival versus self-expression values”
(Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 23, italics in original).
Societies at the traditional pole emphasize religion, absolute standards, and
traditional family values; favor large families; reject divorce; and take a pro-life
stance on abortion, euthanasia, and suicide. They emphasize social conformity
rather than individualistic achievements, favor consensus rather than open political
conflict, support deference to authority, and have high levels of national pride and


























































a nationalistic outlook. Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite
preference on all these topics. (Inglehart, 2000, p. 83)
The latter societies are characterized as modern and tend to be rich, while the former
societies are traditional and tend to be of low income. In the present paper, we aim to
replicate Inglehart’s classification for European regions and to correlate the dominant
values of these regions to their economic development.
Tolerance and Diversity
In today’s knowledge economy, learning, innovation and creativity are of crucial impor-
tance for economic development (Kitson et al., 2004). Although knowledge is available on
a global scale, creativity and learning are still closely connected to specific places. Local
culture is often argued to make places more or less conducive for creativity and learning
(Morgan, 2004). Elaborating on the work of Jacobs (1961), Florida (2002b) argues that
“the presence and concentration of bohemians in an area signals an environment or
milieu that attracts other types of talented or high human capital individuals. The presence
of such human capital concentrations in a region in turn attracts and generates innovative
technology-based industries” (p. 56). In other words, Florida hypothesizes a link, albeit an
indirect one, between bohemian lifestyles and economic development. “Bohemian”, in
Florida’s view, refers to individuals with creative occupations such as authors, designers,
musicians, actors, artists, etc. (Florida, 2002b, p. 59). Bohemians hold social values that
express hedonism, non-conformism and a dislike of large organizations and bureaucracy
(Florida, 2002a). As Florida argued, this means that bohemians are attracted to places that
are open and tolerant to non-traditional lifestyles and that embrace socio-cultural diversity.
Given the openness and tolerance of these places, all sorts of “non-traditional” people
such as gays and ethnic minorities can be found there in substantial numbers, which
further stresses a climate that is open to new ideas and change. This makes these places
particularly good breeding grounds for creative occupations, since creativity produces
new ideas and change. Highly talented people in other knowledge-intensive professions,
such as lawyers, doctors, consultants and IT specialists, are attracted to these places
because they offer a rich and diverse urban environment with many cultural amenities.
In turn, these highly talented people work for companies, such as high-technology
industries, that are the drivers behind economic development in the knowledge economy.
When we tested this hypothesis underlying Florida’s work (Rutten & Gelissen, 2008), we
too found a significant correlation between the presence of bohemian values, tolerance
for non-traditional lifestyles and a high concentration of non-nationals, on the one hand,
and technology, innovation and economic development, on the other hand.
Consequently, there may indeed be an indirect relation between tolerance for non-
traditional values and lifestyles and socio-cultural diversity of regions and their economic
development, in that tolerance and diversity create an environment in which creativity can
flourish. This attracts creative and talented people who are needed for knowledge creation
and innovation which fuels economic development (Florida, 2002b, p.68). Although the
work of Florida has met with substantial criticism (Glaeser, 2005), empirical evidence
of Florida himself (2002a, 2002b) and our own research (Rutten & Gelissen, 2008) is
sufficiently compelling to include tolerance and diversity in the present study into
social values and the economic development of regions.



























































We acknowledge that the various social values work in combination, not in isolation of
one another. Therefore, we developed a path model that includes all the social values dis-
cussed above. The aim of our path model is to explain how the different variables in our
research contribute to the explanation of the economic development of regions. Based on
the causal mechanisms as discussed in the literature, this section develops a comprehen-
sive theoretical model that explains how the different variables are conceptually related
to each other.
Various empirical studies (Beugelsdijk & Van Schaik, 2005; Westlund, 2006; Hauser
et al., 2007) show that social networks (as part of social capital) contribute to economic
development. This is because social capital reduces transactions costs (Westlund, 2006).
Moreover, economic life is subject to conventions, informal rules and habits that coordi-
nate actors, the so-called untraded interdependencies (Storper, 1997). Social networks
(social capital) are the vehicles on which untraded interdependencies are effected in
economic life. Social networks (social capital) also have a positive effect on innovation.
The commonly used causal mechanism to explain this effect borrows from the social
network literature (Granovetter, 1973; Coleman, 1988; Burt, 2005). On the one hand,
bonding and bridging social capital both have a positive effect on knowledge exchange in
networks, which, in turn, fuels innovation. On the other hand, strongly shared network
norms and values, such as trust, increase the likelihood of knowledge exchange between
network partners as it reduces risks. Knowledge exchange always carries the risk that com-
petitive advantage may be lost, in particular for the initiator of the knowledge exchange.
Empirical evidence for a strong effect of social capital on innovation comes from
Akçomak and ter Weel (2008).
We have conceptualized the social values element of social capital in several variables.
“Self-expression”, which includes trust, captures modernist values. They signal an open
attitude and a desire to achieve things in life. It may therefore have a positive effect on
both social networks and innovation. Self-expression may make it more likely for
people to engage in social networking and thus increases the social capital. Self-expression
may also make people more willing to share knowledge and make them more open to new
ideas, which increases innovation. Self-expression, in sum, signals that people are com-
mitted to achieving their ambitions and that they are more open to others and to new
ideas. Traditional values, on the other hand, may have the opposite effect. Moreover,
modern societies tend to be richer than traditional ones (Granato et al., 1996). This is
because traditional values may encourage a society to develop an inward-looking attitude
where people prefer to keep to themselves and are skeptical towards outsiders. This will
have a negative effect on social networks (social capital). The fact that traditional societies
are more reluctant to accept new ideas and new ways of doing things may have a direct
negative effect on economic development. But it also negatively affects innovation.
Traditional values may further negatively effect innovation because people in traditional
societies may be reluctant to share knowledge and ideas.
Although a protestant work ethic is traditionally believed to encourage economic devel-
opment, we take a more nuanced perspective. The knowledge economy is not about
working hard, it is about working smart (Best, 2001). A Protestant work ethic may have
a positive effect on economic development because societies that work hard will be
better off than the ones that do not. However, if the emphasis is on working hard and


























































not on working smart, it may have a negative effect on economic development as no
amount of hard work can compete with technological sophistication in modern
economies. The distinction between working hard and working smart suggests that
there may also be an effect of Protestant ethic on innovation. Societies that value
working hard without being concerned about the kind of work they do, or how they do
it, may have lower levels of innovation. According to Schumpeter (in Best, 2001),
innovation is about creative destruction. New practices must replace old ones. Protestant
ethic, however, may resist embracing the destructive element of innovation, as people may
be reluctant to creatively destruct the fruits of their hard work. On the other hand, if
working hard and working smart go hand in hand, Protestant ethic may have a positive
effect on innovation.
The final social value that is deemed to encourage economic development is tolerance.
Tolerance for non-traditional lifestyles signals openness to new ideas, new ways of doing
things and to different kinds of people. This is believed to be conducive to innovation
(Florida, 2002a). This kind of openness is also argued to be good for economic develop-
ment in general, since it favours entrepreneurship (Granato et al., 1996; Landes 1998).
Therefore, we expect a positive effect of tolerance on economic development. In addition,
tolerance may have a positive effect on social networks since it makes it more likely that
people from different lifestyles will connect in social networks.
Melting pot is not a social value as such but it signals socio-cultural diversity in a
society which, in turn, may have an effect on various social values. Melting pot may
have a positive effect on tolerance because societies that are confronted with socio-cultural
diversity may become more tolerant towards it. This is especially visible in the big cities of
the Western world (Florida, 2002a). Melting pot may also have a positive effect on inno-
vation since socio-culturally diverse societies may generate more new ideas (Florida,
2002a). Melting pot may have a negative effect on traditional values since those values
may become increasingly less effective in a socio-culturally diverse society. On the
other hand, if different socio-cultural groups in a society do not mix but develop an
inward-looking attitude and adopt hostile feelings towards other groups, melting pot
may actually encourage traditional values. Both mechanisms can be observed in many
modern societies.
Human capital, too, may affect social values, as well as innovation and economic
development. It may affect innovation because higher levels of human capital allow a
society to develop and apply more complex technologies. Similarly, high levels of
human capital allow more complex economic transactions to take place, which directly
affects economic development. In addition, higher levels of education (human capital)
may lead a society to move away from traditional values (Landes, 1998; Huntington &
Harrison, 2000), which leads to a negative relation between human capital and traditional
values. Furthermore, higher levels of education in a society may encourage tolerance of
socio-cultural diversity because higher educated people are more inclined to judge
people on their merits and achievements rather than their socio-cultural background
(Granato et al., 1996).
Finally, we include urbanization as a control variable for spurious associations in our
model. As argued, urban regions are centres of gravity of economic development and
socio-cultural life. They are the hubs of human social networks and they act as magnets
to talented people (Jacobs, 1961; Florida, 2002a). An overview of the variables and the
assumed causal relations between them is presented in Figure 1.



























































For practical reasons, the analysis in this paper is limited to the regions of the 15 “old”
EU member states, since the availability of data is least problematic for these countries.
Furthermore, the analysis is based on the statistical subdivision of the EU in NUTS
regions. Our data set includes 129 regions (Table 1) After listwise deletion of missing
values, we analysed data from 120 European regions. The regions in our sample are a
mix of Nuts 1 and Nuts 2 regions. Nuts regions are administrative and/or statistical
territorial units. Nuts 1 regions are the largest sub-national division, Nuts 2 regions are
mostly somewhat smaller. Although the largest Nuts 1 regions are considerably larger
in terms of surface and population than the smallest Nuts 2 regions, both types of
regions are comparable in that they represent sizable sub-national units. A practical
reason to include both Nuts 1 and Nuts 2 regions is that it increased the number of
observations for our empirical analysis.
Operationalization
In this section, we discuss the operationalizations of our variables. The dependent variable
in our study is Wealth, measured as the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in
purchasing parities, since higher levels of economic development usually translate into
more wealth. In this study, we used cross-sectional data on GDP levels from 2005.
Other variables were measured using data from earlier years (around 2000) in order to
confirm the plausibility of posited causal effects.
The four social values identified above represent four different trains of thought on how
social values help create an environment conducive to economic development. In defining
Figure 1. Theoretical model


























































Table 1. The regions
1 Brussels 48 Illes Balears 95 Niederösterreich
2 Antwerpen 49 Andalucia 96 Wien
3 Limburg (B) 50 Murcia 97 Kärnten
4 Oost-Vlaanderen 51 Canarias 98 Steiermark
5 Vlaams-Brabant 52 Île de France 99 Oberösterreich
6 West-Vlaanderen 53 Bassin Parisien 100 Salzburg
7 Brabant Wallon 54 Nord-Pas de Calais 101 Tirol
8 Hainaut 55 Est 102 Vorarlberg
9 Liège 56 Ouest 103 Norte
10 Luxembourg (B) 57 Sud-Ouest 104 Centro
11 Namur 58 Centre-Est 105 Lisboa e Vale do Tejo
12 Denmark 59 Méditerranée 106 Alentejo
13 Baden-Württemberg 60 Ireland 107 Algarve
14 Bayern 61 Piemonte 108 Itä Suomi
15 Berlin 62 Valle d’Aosta 109 Etelä-Suomi
16 Brandenburg 63 Liguria 110 Väli-Suomi
17 Bremen 64 Lombardia 111 Pohjois-Suomi
18 Hamburg 65 Trentino-Süd Tirol 112 Stockholm
19 Hessen 66 Veneto 113 Östra Mellansverige
20 Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern
67 Friuli-Venezia-Giulia 114 Sydsverige
21 Niedersachsen 68 Emilia Romagna 115 Norra Mellansverige
22 Nordrhein-Westfalen 69 Toscana 116 Mellersta Norrland + Övre
Norrland
23 Rheinland-Pfalz 70 Umbria 117 Småland med öarna +
Västsverige
24 Saarland 71 Marche 118 North East
25 Sachsen 72 Lazia 119 North West
26 Sachsen-Anhalt 73 Abruzzo 120 Yorkshire and the Humber
27 Schleswig-Holstein 74 Molise 121 East Midlands
28 Thüringen 75 Campania 122 West Midlands
29 Thessalia 76 Puglia 123 Eastern
30 Sterea Ellada 77 Basilicata 124 London
31 Peloponnisos 78 Calabria 125 South East
32 Attiki 79 Sicilia 126 South West
33 Notio Aigaio 80 Sardegna 127 Wales
34 Kriti 81 Luxembourg (Grand-
Duché)
128 Scotland
35 Galicia 82 Groningen 129 Northern Ireland
36 Asturias 83 Friesland
37 Cantabria 84 Drenthe
38 Pais Vasco 85 Overijssel
39 Navarra 86 Gelderland
40 La Rioja 87 Flevoland
41 Aragón 88 Utrecht
42 Madrid 89 Noord-Holland
43 Castilla y Leon 90 Zuid-Holland
44 Castilla-la Mancha 91 Zeeland
45 Extremadure 92 Noord-Brabant
46 Cataluña 93 Limburg (NL)
47 Valencia 94 Burgenland


























































the four social values, we have tried to focus on their key assumptions, as this may allow us
to identify the different roles that they are argued to play by their advocates. This also
helps to avoid conceptual overlap.
The different variables are operationally defined as follows. In accordance with the
work of Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik (2005), we constructed two dimensions for Social
networks: membership of networks and activity in networks. Using the same EVS
questions to measure both dimensions we, too, found that they measure the same variable,
that is, the social networks aspect of social capital. To measure Protestant ethic, we
constructed a scale from EVS that measures attitudes towards work. Factor analysis
confirmed our scale. Modernist values we measured in the same way as Granato et al.
(1996), on the basis of EVS data. Using similar or equivalent questions from EVS
compared with their World Values Studies questions, we constructed two variables:
Traditional values and Self-expression. The diversity values of Florida (2002a) we cap-
tured in two variables. From EVS, we constructed a Tolerance variable that measures
the tolerance for non-traditional lifestyles. Eurostat data yielded our Melting pot variable,
which measures the socio-cultural diversity of a region in terms of the percentage of
non-nationals in a population.
In addition to the social values variables, we added several other variables that, accord-
ing to the literature, affect economic development. Innovation is an important variable
explaining economic development and is often measured in terms of R&D expenditure
and patents (Hauser et al., 2007). Drawing from the Eurostat database, we found that
both measurements of innovation are highly correlated for the regions in our sample.
Therefore, we chose only to include patents in our analysis. Another variable that must
be taken into account is the level of Human capital of a region, which is often measured
as the educational level of the work force (Florida, 2002a). Finally, urban regions, for a
variety of reasons, are often more economically developed than other regions. Therefore,
we used population density as a proxy for Urbanization (see Table 2 for more detailed
operationalizations).
Descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in Table 3. Correlations between all
variables are reported in Table 4.
Findings
In Table 5, we report the empirical results of a path-modelling regression analysis1
pertaining to our theoretical model. Reported coefficients are standardized regression
coefficients.
The findings of the first model, in which Wealth is regressed on social values/networks
and structural characteristics of regions, indicate that Innovation is positively related to
Wealth, holding constant other variables. Social networks is also positively related to
Wealth, all else being equal. Finally, we find that as the degree of Urbanization of a
region is higher, regional Wealth is also higher. The second model shows that Social
networks, Self-expression and Tolerance are all directly related to Innovation, holding
constant differences in Human capital between regions. Human capital is also positively
related to Innovation, holding other variables constant. The third model shows that
regional differences in Social networks are not directly related to regional differences in
other social values. The findings pertaining to the final model indicate that as regions
score higher on Melting pot, they have lower scores on Tolerance, holding constant


























































regional differences in Talent. We summarize these findings in Figure 2, which graphically
depicts all significant relationships between the variables reported in Table 5.
As to the direct effects on Wealth, our findings are partially in agreement with our
assumptions. Unsurprisingly, Innovation is positively and directly related to wealth, as
Table 2. The variables
Variable Measurement
Wealth GDP per capita in purchasing parities (2001). Source: Eurostat
Urbanization Population density (inhabitants per km2) (2001). Source: Eurostat
Innovation Patents per million inhabitants (3-year average 1999–2002). Source: Eurostat
Human capital Percentage of the workforce with a bachelor degree or higher (2002). Source:
Eurostat
Melting pot Percentage of non-nationals in the population (2002). Source: Eurostat
Tolerance Could you sort out groups of people that you do not like to have as neighbours:
people from different race, Muslims, immigrants/foreign workers,
homosexuals, Jews, gypsies. Source: EVS (1999 survey)
Social networks Do you belong to/do you do unpaid work for any of the following organizations:
welfare organizations; religious organizations; cultural activities; trade
unions; political parties/groups; local community action; Third World
development/human rights; environment; professional associations; youth
work; sports/recreation; women’s groups; peace movement; voluntary health
organizations; other groups. Source: EVS (1999 survey)
Protestant Ethic A composite index based on the following attitudes: job needed to develop
talents; humiliation receiving money without work; people turn lazy not




A composite index based on the following attitudes (based on Granato et al.,
1996): how important is God in your life; teach children at home: religious
faith; do you justify abortion; how proud are you to be a citizen of your
country? Source: EVS (1999 survey)
Self-expression A composite index based on the following attitudes (based on Granato et al.,
1996): which is more important: freedom or equality; how happy are you;
signing a petition; do you justify homosexuality; people can be trusted/cannot
be too careful. Source: EVS (1999 survey)
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of exogeneous and endogenous variables
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. deviation
Wealth 129 13,399.40 59,201.80 24,832.66 7088.91
Urbanization 130 3.90 6015.50 369.93 820.69
Melting pot 130 7.99 438.75 95.36 76.71
Human capital 130 31.02 192.13 98.01 38.05
Innovation 130 .33 454.30 81.91 85.08
Protestant ethic 121 2.60 4.30 3.38 .34
Tolerance 130 0.02 0.48 0.16 0.08
Traditional values 130 21.28 1.19 0.00 0.468
Social networks 130 0.00 100.00 26.74 18.44
Self-expression 130 0.00 100.00 61.84 18.19
Valid N (listwise) 120










































































Melting pot 0.655∗∗ 0.546∗∗
Human capital 0.403∗∗ 0.346∗∗ 0.320∗∗
Innovation 0.434∗∗ 0.096 0.357∗∗ 0.406∗∗
Protestant ethic 20.398∗∗ 20.250∗∗ 20.282∗∗ 20.629∗∗ 20.374∗∗
Tolerance 20.176 20.134 20.332∗∗ 20.299∗∗ 20.192∗ 0.464∗∗
Social
networks
0.265∗∗ 20.008 0.170 0.117 0.301∗∗ 20.449∗∗ 20.152
Self-expression 0.257∗∗ 0.165 0.350∗∗ 0.245∗∗ 0.413∗∗ 20.419∗∗ 20.782∗∗ 0.240∗∗
Traditional
values
20.340∗∗ 20.180∗ 20.265∗∗ 20.589∗∗ 20.466∗∗ 0.589∗∗ 0.380∗∗ 20.250∗∗ 20.502∗∗
Note: N (listwise ¼120).
∗p , 0.05 (two-tailed test).





























































































is Social networks. The latter finding means that membership of and activity in networks
correlates positively with economic development, which gives some support for the
“closure thesis” as developed by Coleman (1988). Our control variable Urbanization is
also positively related to Wealth, which is in line with mainstream thought in economic
geography on the role of cities as catalysts of economic development (Storper, 1997;
Florida, 2002a; Morgan, 2004).
Most of the social values in our model proved to have an indirect effect on Wealth,
through Innovation. Self-expression has the strongest direct effect on Innovation, which
offers support for our assumption that an open attitude favours the development and
Table 5. Summary of path regression analysis for variables predicting wealth, innovation
and social networks of regions (number of regions ¼ 120; number of countries ¼ 15)
Dependent variables
Wealth Innovation Social networks Tolerance
Beta s.e. Beta s.e. Beta s.e. Beta s.e.
Human capital 0.051 0.15 0.333∗∗ 0.114 20.005 0.004
Innovation 0.315∗∗ 0.07
Tolerance 0.010 0.04 0.465∗∗ 0.151 0.088 0.316
Urbanization 0.467∗∗ 0.09
Melting pot 0.152 0.099 20.004∗∗ 0.001
Protestant ethic 20.051 0.15 0.042 0.085
Self-expression 0.562∗∗ 0.187 0.230 0.327
Social networks 0.144∗∗ 0.05 0.164∗ 0.065
Traditional values 20.002 0.10 20.091 0.160 20.165 0.192
R2 0.506 0.419 0.082 0.145
Note: Standard errors are adjusted for clustering of regions within countries.
∗p , 0.05 (two-tailed test).
∗∗p , 0.01 (two-tailed test).
Figure 2. Path model, significant effects only


























































adoption of new ideas, and consequently, promotes innovation, which in its turn promotes
Wealth. Additionally, the positive effect of Self-expression on Innovation gives some
support to the modernism thesis (Granato et al., 1996). The direct effect of Tolerance
on Innovation that we found in our model leads to a similar conclusion. In other words,
these findings are in agreement with the Florida (2002a, 2002b) thesis. Notably,
missing for this Florida argument, though, is Melting pot, which, contrary to our assump-
tions, proves to have no direct effect on Innovation in our model, and only a very weak
indirect effect via Tolerance. Contrary to the modernist thesis, Traditional values has
no (negative) direct or indirect effect on Innovation in our model. Human capital, on
the other hand, does have a (positive) direct effect on Innovation (but not on Wealth, so
the effect of Innovation on Wealth is not spurious due to differences in Human capital
between regions), which is in line with the mainstream literature on innovation. We
found no effect of Protestant ethic but Social networks has a small positive indirect
effect on Wealth via Innovation (the total indirect effect being 0.164 ∗ 0.315 ¼ 0.052),
as well as a stronger direct positive effect on Wealth. The latter direct effect of Social net-
works on Wealth gives some support to the various views in the literature of the role played
by social capital in economic life (Coleman, 1998; Burt, 2005; Westlund, 2006), although
our data are too limited to speak in favour of either bonding or bridging. The effect of
Social networks on Innovation suggests that members of and activity in networks may
be conducive to fostering knowledge flows that are at the basis of innovation. In addition,
we found that Urbanization is not directly related to Innovation, and thus the effect of
Innovation on Wealth is not spurious due to differences in levels of Urbanization
between regions.
We also analysed the effects of Tolerance, Traditional values and Self-expression on
Social networks, but, contrary to our assumptions, found no effects at all. This may
mean that our theory is wrong, but it may also be the result of a necessarily weak
operationalization of social networks as a membership of and an activity in social
networks. This may explain the absence of any empirical effects, at least partially, since
this operationalization does not accurately cover the theoretical definition of social
networks that we used. For example, it may be problematic to relate membership of
and activity in social networks to traditional values or self-expression. Particularly since
the kind of social networks in our study (membership of unions, religious communities,
local community associations, etc.) may signal an inward-looking attitude rather than
the embrace-the-world attitude that the modernism thesis advocates. In other words, the
social networks that facilitate creativity, innovation and, ultimately, economic develop-
ment, may not be the ones in our study.
Furthermore, we investigated the assumed effects of Melting pot and Human capital on
Tolerance. We found no direct effect of human capital and a negative effect of melting pot,
while we expected a positive effect of the latter. Contrary to our expectations, our model
finds that higher levels of socio-cultural diversity in a region reduce the level of tolerance
of that region’s population. One explanation is that we may be investigating this effect
at the wrong level of analysis. Socio-cultural diversity in a region (Melting pot) may
negatively affect the level of tolerance of a region’s population when people see familiar
areas undergo considerable change (Day, 2006). However, the social and professional
circles where creativity and innovation flourishes may continue to foster a tolerant attitude,
even if tolerance in the region as a whole is in decline. A better measure would take into
account such more fine-grained compositional differences, but such measures are currently


























































not available. Finally, we note that the significant effects of exogenous and endogenous
variables are found while holding constant for differences in the levels of urbanization
of regions. This means, for example, that social values are relevant for the explanation
of economic development and that this effect is not confounded by differences in urban-
ization between regions.
In sum, our findings suggest the following. First, that the effect of social capital (net-
works and values) on wealth is primarily an indirect effect through innovation. Second,
that the various social values and social networks are largely independent of one
another in our model. Third, that the various social values and social networks are unre-
lated to urbanization in our model. On the positive side, this means that we have found
some evidence to support the claim that social capital (networks and values) matters in
the explanation of the economic development of regions and that the effect of social
values cannot simply be argued away by urbanization. On the negative side, however,
we have not been able to shed light on the relations between the various social values
that are strongly indicated in the literature. One possible explanation for this is a weak
operationalization of our variables in terms of reliability and validity, such as in the
case of social networks and tolerance. Another possible explanation for our failure to
find relations between the social values/networks is that we may be looking at the
wrong level of analysis. That is, we may have to look at subgroups in a region rather
than at the regional population as a whole. It is conceivable that, for example, for the
members of the creative class (Florida, 2002a) the relations between the various social
values are in agreement with our assumptions. It is equally conceivable that, at the
same time, the relations between the social values as held by traditional blue collar
workers shows the opposite pattern and that, consequently, statistical effects largely
disappear on the level of the regional population as a whole. Put differently, the causal
mechanisms between the variables in our model may be different for different subgroups
in the population of a region. More fine-grained data are needed to test this assumption.
Finally, it is worth noting that our results are in agreement with those from Westlund
and Calidoni-Lundberg (2007). Their study offers support for the effect of melting pot,
tolerance and traditional values on regional development in Japan. However, they too
found that the results are sensitive to the spatial level chosen for the analysis.
Conclusions and Discussion
In this contribution, we have made a first theoretical and empirical effort to model the
mechanisms in which social capital (networks and values) may be relevant for the
explanation of regional differences in wealth. Our findings suggest social capital, that is,
social networks (Coleman, 1988, Burt, 2005), modernism (Inglehart, 2000, Inglehart &
Baker, 2002) and tolerance and diversity (Florida, 2002a, 2002b), affects regional economic
development, albeit largely indirectly through innovation. Moreover, this effect is not
spurious as both innovation and wealth are a consequence of urbanization. However, in
view of the nature of our data, there are two notes of caution when interpreting our findings.
First, the operationalizations of our variables do not satisfactorily measure the underlying
theoretical concepts. Second, our findings suggest that the region may not be the proper
level to analyse the causal mechanisms that we hypothesized. With regard to the operatio-
nalizations, in the first place, one can point at GDP per capita as a flawed measure of
economic development (Beugelsdijk and Van Schaijk, 2005). More importantly, though,


























































our theoretical understanding of innovation refers to the creative efforts of knowledge
workers, while our variables measure patents. That is, we use an output indicator to
measure a process. Also, our measure for social networks seems limited, since it captures
the membership of and the activity in a particular type of social networks. These networks
do not necessarily matter for creativity and innovation. That is, they may not provide access
to the kind of resources that matter in the knowledge economy.
Our main conclusion is that we found social values and social networks to be
important—in an indirect mr, because they promote innovation—in the explanation of
regional economic development. However, the evidence is not overwhelming, and we
propose as a tentative explanation for this finding the hypothesis that social values and
social networks are more effective at the level of subgroups in the regional population
rather than at the level of the region as a whole. The theoretical argument underlying
this conclusion is that social values are effected through social interactions in networks.
Therefore, in order to explain how social values impact on regional economic develop-
ment, one has to look at subgroups in the regional population and their networks, that
is, their social capital. Although evidence suggests that (national) social values affect
economic development (Hofstede, 1980; Landes, 1998; Huntington & Harrison, 2000),
the kind of social values that are argued as relevant for knowledge-based economic devel-
opment are by no means pervasive throughout a population (Jacobs, 1961; Florida, 2002a).
Rather, these social values are characteristics of social networks (Field, 2003; Morgan,
2004; Day, 2006). Social values, such as modernism, tolerance and diversity, to a large
extent govern interactions in social networks. That is, they decide whether networks are
open-minded places for the exchange of a wide variety of ideas, or whether they are
inward-looking and suspicious of new ideas. The first type of networks are expected to
support creativity, knowledge creation, innovation and, therefore, economic development.
The second type of networks are expected to hamper knowledge-based economic
development. We argue that regions are likely to host both types of networks. Looking
at networks rather than at regions sheds a different light on the spatial dimension. After
all, networks are not necessarily spatially restricted. So the question arises: How are
social values spatially sticky? In line with Florida (2002a) and Morgan (2004), we
argue that humans are spatially sticky, even in a globalized world. The demographic,
cultural, social and economic characteristics of the places where they live and work
shape how they interact in social networks and thus to the kind of social values that
become dominant. Therefore, social values may differ from one place to another. It also
leaves open the possibility that a specific place may support very different social values
if the subgroups living there do not frequently interact (Etzioni, 1996; Day, 2006). That
is, places may be home to a variety of socio-cultural “biotopes”.
Given that social values are acted out at the level of social networks, more fine-grained
data are necessary to research how social values contribute to regional economic develop-
ment. At the very least, research needs to focus on the various subgroups in a regional
population, for example, on what Florida calls the creative class. Members of the creative
class may hold different social values compared with other subgroups in the regional popu-
lation, but they may also differ from one region to another. Only if we know the social
values of the creative class in a particular location can we understand how these values
affect interaction in networks. This also means that a narrow conceptualization of social
capital as networks that give access to resources (the structural dimension) is not sufficient.
Having access to resources and being able to use them is as much a function of the social


























































values governing network interactions as it is of the structure of a network. In other words,
we argue that social values must be prominently included in the study of social capital for a
proper understanding of how social capital may contribute to economic development.
Note
1. Standard errors of parameters are adjusted because of non-independence of regions due to clustering
within countries by using a sandwich estimator. The model estimation was done in Mplus.
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